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Capacity Choice and Duopoly Incentives for Information Sharing
by William Novshek and Lynda Thoman
We examine a three-stage game in which duopolists face a random demand intercept.
The firms first choose capacities, then decide whether to commit to share the private
information they will receive about the intercept. After the private information is
observed, firms choose output levels. Comparing the results to an alternative model
without capacity choice or capacity constraints, we show the existence of a capacity
choice stage may reverse the incentives to share information, and lead to  equilibria in
which information sharing occurs. We use binary uncertainty since the common linear-
normal model cannot handle capacity constraints.
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Kapazitätsentscheidungen und Duopolanreize bei Informationsaustausch
In dem Beitrag wird ein dreistufiges Spiel vorgestellt, in dem sich Duopolisten einer
Nachfrage gegenübersehen, die eine Zufallsgröße ist. Die Unternehmen entscheiden auf
der ersten Stufe über Kapazitäten, dann können sie sich freiwillig verpflichten, ihre priva-
ten Information auszutauschen, die sie über das Marktvolumen erhalten werden. Nach
der Beobachtung der privaten Information entscheiden die Unternehmen über die Ange-
botsmenge. Ein Vergleich der Ergebnisse dieses Spiels mit einem alternativen Modell
ohne Kapazitätsentscheidung oder Kapazitätsbeschränkungen zeigt, daß die Existenz
einer Kapazitätsentscheidungsstufe die Anreize zum Austausch von Informationen um-
kehren und zu Gleichgewichten führen kann, in denen Informationsaustausch stattfindet.
In dem Spiel wird Unsicherheit binär modelliert, da das übliche linear-normalverteilte
Modell keine Kapazitätsbeschränkungen erfassen kann.1
Capacity Choice and Duopoly Incentives for Information Sharing
1. Introduction
We are interested in the role of capacity and capacity choice in the incentives of firms
to share information about a random demand intercept.  Standard information sharing models
contain no capacity restrictions.  In essence, capacity and output choices are made
simultaneously.  Our point is simple but powerful:  Separation of the capacity and output
choices into different stages sometimes reverses previous results on firms’ incentives  to share
information.
To understand why the existence of a capacity choice stage may reverse the incentives
to share information, it is instructive to consider first a case with capacity constraints which are
exogenously set.  When set at certain levels, the capacity constraints can reduce one of the
profit-reducing effects of information sharing.  When information is shared and both firms
receive high signals, they are fairly confident that the demand intercept is large.  In their
resulting output choices, the capacity constraints are binding, and prevent the firms from being
“too competitive” (i.e., they keep the firms closer to the collusive output).  When the firms do
not share information, they are less sure that the demand intercept is large when they receive a
high signal, so the capacity constraint does not bind as often or with as much impact.  The
result is that, for certain exogenous capacity levels, information sharing becomes relatively
more attractive to the firms than it would have been without the capacity constraints.
The remaining question is whether such capacities, at which the information sharing
incentives are reversed, would be endogenously chosen by firms in an equilibrium.  We show
that the answer is sometimes, but not always, yes.  We consider a multistage game:  in the First
Stage, firms choose capacities; in the Second Stage, firms decide whether to share information;
in the Third Stage, firms play a Cournot game, choosing outputs given their capacity and2
information-sharing decisions.  We focus on two types of parameter combinations in which,
without capacity constraints, there is a unique equilibrium, and that equilibrium does not
involve information sharing.  The first combination involves equally well informed firms while
the second combination involves firms with very different levels of information.  In both, we
show that the existence of a capacity choice stage sometimes leads to equilibria in which
information sharing occurs. We conclude that the endogenously chosen information sharing is
due to the capacity choice stage.
The most commonly used model for examining information sharing about a random
demand parameter includes linear marginal cost for each firm and linear demand with a
random, normally-distributed intercept.  The firms receive signals which are also normally
distributed.  To simplify the analysis, the nonnegativity constraints on quantities and prices are
ignored.  This is justified by the argument that, by appropriate restrictions on the parameters,
at the “equilibrium,” the probability with which the nonnegativity constraints are violated may
be made smaller than any pre-specified, strictly positive target.
The linear-normal model cannot be applied successfully when capacities are
endogenously chosen.  Even if one is completely happy with the approximation argument when
there are no capacity constraints, the probability of violating the capacity constraints cannot be
made arbitrarily small without pre-specifying the capacities, as if they were exogenous
parameters rather than endogenously determined choice variables.  For some endogenously
chosen capacity levels, firms will be capacity constrained with high probability, and the
standard linear-normal formulas will be seriously wrong.  In equilibrium, the capacity
constraints will be binding with significant probability.  Roughly speaking, if that were not true,
the firm could decrease capacity in the First Stage, for a first-order reduction in cost, with only
a minor reduction in expected revenue.3
By taking strict account of the capacity and nonnegativity constraints, we introduce
substantial complications into the analysis.  For example, given the information structure
(including the sharing or nonsharing choice), the Third Stage equilibrium in outputs will take
one of several forms, depending on the capacity levels chosen in the First Stage.  The capacity
choices will determine the number of states in which capacity is binding, and this will lead to
complicated weighted sums for the corresponding expected payoffs to use in the Second
Stage.  The level of complication has motivated us to use the simplest possible structure for the
uncertainty, the binary model, as well as to focus on special parameter combinations for our
specific results.  While the examples are fairly specific, the results are quite robust.  It is a
straightforward, though tedious, exercise to use continuity arguments to show our results
apply to a much wider range of parameter values.  (Actual solution of the problem for general
parameter values is extremely tedious, and does not change our main point:  the incentives to
share information are sometimes reversed when there is a capacity choice stage.)
In the binary model, even without capacity constraints, for certain parameter values
firms have an incentive to share information, and information sharing is a Nash equilibrium.  To
ensure we do not confuse the effects of capacity constraints with the effects of these special
parameter values, we examine a Comparison Model which matches our model except for its
lack of capacity constraints.  Capacity choice can be viewed as being made simultaneously with
quantity choice in the final stage of the Comparison Model.  For the two types of parameter
combinations we consider, the Comparison model has a unique equilibrium, and that
equilibrium does not involve information sharing.  For both parameter combinations, we show
that the existence of a capacity choice stage sometimes leads to equilibria in which information
sharing occurs.
In our time line, capacity choices are made before information sharing decisions.
Capacity choice occurs first because we view it as a longer-run decision than the decision4
whether to commit to information sharing.  If one were to consider capacity choice as a
shorter-run decision than information sharing, the first and second stages of our model would
be reversed.  Though the results are not reported in this paper, an analysis of this alternative
time line leads to the same overall conclusion:  the incentives to share information are
sometimes reversed when there is a capacity choice stage.  In fact, the analysis becomes
somewhat simpler because, in the capacity choice stage, as capacities are changed, the
information sharing decision has already been made at an earlier stage, and cannot vary with
capacities.
Incentives for information sharing about a random demand intercept have been
examined by Novshek and Sonnenschein (1982), Clarke (1983), Vives (1984), Gal-Or (1985),
Li (1985) and many others.  Jin (1992) and Raith (1996) provide more general analyses.
Several papers have shown how the incentives reverse when certain parameters of the problem
change:  Kirby (1988) varies the slope of the (linear) marginal cost curve; Malueg and Tsutsui
(1996), in a model with random demand slope rather than intercept, change the amount of
variation in the slope.  In our analysis, the incentives also change as parameters vary, but that is
not our focus.  Instead, our main point is that the introduction of a capacity choice stage
sometimes, but not always, reverses the incentives to share information.
Section 2 contains a description of the General Model and solution procedure.  The
results for the Comparison Model, which is just a modification of the General Model, are
contained in Section 3.  Section 4 contains the results for the two special examples, one with
equally-well-informed firms, and the other with firms with very different levels of information.
It also includes a brief discussion of unilateral information disclosure in the context of the
second example.  The details of all the results are contained in an appendix.5
2. General Model
In this Section we set out the General Model.  The actual circumstances we will
analyze as well as the Comparison Model are special cases or modifications of this General
Model.  Here we introduce the notation, general assumptions, and time line common to the
cases of interest, and outline the solution procedure.
Two risk-neutral, expected-profit-maximizing firms, i = 1,2, produce a homogeneous
product, to be sold in a single market.  The market inverse demand is A - BQ where Q is the
aggregate quantity produced by the two firms, B is a strictly positive constant, and A is a
random variable which takes the value H with probability t and L with probability 1-t, where H
> L > 0.  Firms know B and the distribution of A, but they do not know the realization of A
when they make their initial decisions.
With no additional information about the realization of A, firms first simultaneously and
independently choose capacity levels.  Both firms have the same cost of capacity, c per unit.
No additional capacity may be purchased in subsequent stages, so these capacity choices
become absolute upper bounds on production.
Next, and again without any additional information about the realization of A, firms
simultaneously and independently decide whether to join a group of firms who will share
information among themselves.  When additional information about A becomes available later,
those who join the group will have access to all the information received by members of the
group, while those who do not join will have access to their own information only.  With just
two firms, this means firms have access to only their own information unless both agree to join
the group and share information.  [In a special case in which only one firm receives additional
information, we will also briefly discuss information disclosure.  By this we mean the informed
firm, before receiving the additional information, unilaterally decides whether the other firm
will also see the additional information.]6
After the firms have decided whether to share information, additional information about
A is received.  Firm i, receives a signal, si, which also takes on the values H and L; the signal is
correct with probability pi (i.e., prob(si=S|A=S) = pi for S=H,L and i = 1,2).  Conditional on
the realization of A, the signals s1 and s2 are independent.  If both firms have decided to share
information, then they both receive both signals.  Otherwise each firm receives its own signal
only.  Each firm uses its additional information to update its belief about the realization of the
demand intercept.  Note when pi = 0.5, the signal is totally uninformative while when pi = 1, the
signal is perfectly informative.  Without loss of generality each pi satisfies 0.5 £ pi  £ 1.  (If not,
let pi* = 1-pi and use si=L as a signal that A=H.)
Given their updated beliefs about the demand intercept, the firms simultaneously and
independently choose output levels.  Both firms have the same constant cost d per unit for
production levels up to their capacities, with d < L.  It is impossible for either firm to produce
more than its capacity.
In summary, the game proceeds through the following time line of three strategic
stages and two non-strategic steps.
Strategic Stage 1:  Firms simultaneously and independently choose capacity levels, Ki, i = 1,2,
at cost c per unit of capacity.
Strategic Stage 2:  Firms simultaneously and independently decide whether to share
information.  Information sharing occurs if and only if both firms decide to share.
Non-strategic information reception step:  The true intercept of the inverse demand function is
realized and firms receive their signals.  If the Stage 2 result is information sharing, then both
firms receive both signals.  Otherwise each firm receives only its own signal.
Strategic Stage 3:  Given their information, firms simultaneously and independently choose
output levels, qi  £ Ki , i = 1,2, at cost d per unit of output (up to capacity Ki).7
Non-strategic payoff step:  Given the realized value of the intercept of the inverse demand
function, A, and the firms’ choices of capacity, K1 and K2, and outputs, q1 and q2, the payoff
for firm i is (A - Bq1 - Bq2)qi - dqi - cKi  (or -dqi - cKi when q1 + q2 > A/B).
We will now outline the solution procedure for the game.  Firms are risk-neutral,
expected-profit maximizers.  Our equilibrium concept is subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium.
We pay careful attention to the solution at each stage so that only economically meaningful
prices and quantities obtain.  That is, we ensure the realized quantities and market prices are
always nonnegative and capacity constraints are never exceeded.
Solving the game backwards, in the final strategic stage we need to find an equilibrium
in quantities given the capacities Ki , i = 1,2, and the information structure.  If firms are not
sharing information, then each firm chooses two output levels, one for each potential value of
the signal it receives, qi
H
 and qi
L, i = 1,2.  Given the value of the signal received by firm i, say si
= H, the firm knows the probability distribution over the possible realizations of the pair (true




L for the other firm, j, this leads to an expected value for the realization of A -
Bqj, call it E
H(qj
H, qj
L).  As long as A - Bqj is nonnegative for every realization of the pair (true
inverse demand intercept, signal received by firm j), the expected profit for firm i is (E
H - Bqi)qi
- dqi - cKi whenever qi is less than E
H/B.  Taking account of the capacity constraint and the
nonnegativity constraint, the corresponding best response function for firm i having seen signal








Similarly, we find the best response functions for firm i having seen signal si = L
and for firm j having seen either of the two possible signal values.  The four equations are then
solved simultaneously to find the Third Stage equilibrium outputs.  The weighted average of
the expected profits for firm i conditional on the signal received by firm i, where the weights8
are the probabilities of receiving the different signals, is the overall expected profit for firm i.
Thus we have derived the payoff functions pi
NS(K1, K2), i = 1,2 for the Third Stage equilibrium
without information sharing and given the capacities.
If firms are sharing information, then in the final strategic stage each firm chooses four






LL, i = 1,2.  Given the value of the pair of signals received by both firms, say HH, each firm
knows the other firm received the same pair of signals, and knows the probability distribution
over the possible realizations of the true inverse demand intercept given the pair of signals HH.
Given anticipated output qj
HH
 for the other firm, j, this leads to an expected value for the
realization of A - Bqj, call it E
HH(qj
HH).  As long as A - Bqj is nonnegative for every realization
of the true inverse demand intercept, the expected profit for firm i is (E
HH - Bqi)qi - dqi - cKi
whenever qi is less than E
HH/B.  Taking account of the capacity constraint and the
nonnegativity constraint, the corresponding best response function for firm i having seen the
pair of signals HH is
 qi
HH(qj
HH) = maximum{0, minimum[Ki, (E
HH(qj
HH) - d)/2B]}.
Similarly, we find the best response functions for firm j having seen the same pair of
signals.  The two equations are then solved simultaneously to find the equilibrium outputs and
corresponding expected profits for the sharing case when the pair of signals is HH.  We solve a
similar problem for each possible pair of signals.  The weighted average of the expected profits
for firm i conditional on the pair of signals received by firm i, where the weights are the
probabilities of receiving the different pairs of signals, is the overall expected profit for firm i.
Thus we have derived the payoff functions pi
S(K1, K2), i = 1,2 for the Third Stage equilibrium
with information sharing and given the capacities.
By appropriate restrictions on the parameters, we ensure that the procedure used to
solve the Third Stage for the sharing and the nonsharing cases is correct, and yields the correct9
profit formulas.  In particular, we restrict the parameters so that e.g., for the nonsharing case,
A - Bq1
s1- Bq2
 s2 is nonnegative for every possible realization of the triple (A, s1, s2).  That such
conditions do not automatically hold is easily seen by considering a monopolist with p = 0.5
(so no updating of beliefs occurs), t near 1, K large, B = 1, and H very large relative to L and
d.  Such a monopolist would find it optimal to “ignore” the state in which the intercept is L,
producing q* = (H - d)/2B.  When the intercept is L, L - Bq* < 0, and a very large reduction in
output would be necessary to obtain a strictly positive price.
Now that we have obtained Third Stage equilibrium payoff functions with and without
information sharing, we can analyze the second strategic stage of the game.  Given (K1, K2),
firm i prefers to share information if pi
S(K1, K2) > pi
NS(K1, K2) i = 1,2.  Information sharing
occurs if and only if both firms agree to share information.  Thus there are three regions of (K1,
K2) values:  M
NS = {(K1, K2) | pi
S(K1, K2) < pi
NS(K1, K2) for i = 1 or i = 2} is the set of capacity
pairs at which the Second Stage equilibrium involves nonsharing of information; M
S = {(K1,
K2) | pi
S(K1, K2) > pi
NS(K1, K2) for i = 1 and i = 2} is the set of capacity pairs at which the
Second Stage equilibrium involves sharing of information; and M
E = {(K1, K2) | pi
S(K1, K2) ‡
pi
NS(K1, K2) for i = 1 and i = 2 with equality for at least one firm} is the set of capacity pairs at
which there are two Second Stage equilibria, one with sharing of information and the other
with nonsharing of information.  Note that for (K1, K2) in M
E, the two equilibria at (K1, K2)
have the same payoff for the firm that is indifferent, but not for the other firm.  In general, as




of the Second Stage equilibrium payoff functions (actually correspondences), pi(K1, K2), i =
1,2, is discontinuous, with a jump down in profit as we move from M
S to M
NS.  At the
boundary, the other firm vetoes information sharing, leading to the drop in profit.10
With the Second Stage equilibrium payoff functions, pi(K1, K2), i = 1,2, we can analyze
the first stage capacity choice.  To solve this stage we find Nash equilibria in capacities with
the given payoff functions.  If one were interested in finding all equilibria for the general
model, it would be necessary to check for a type of “boundary” equilibria in which the
equilibrium capacities lie in M
E and information sharing occurs.  The equilibria are at a
“boundary” in the sense that the firm whose payoff function is discontinuous at the equilibrium
capacities would prefer to change capacity if information sharing could be maintained, but the
(conditionally) desired change in its capacity would lead the other firm to veto information
sharing.  This difficulty will not arise in the equilibria we find in our special cases.
We will consider two special cases.  In the first, the two firms are equally well informed
and the high and low demand states are equally likely:  0.5 < p1 = p2 = p < 1 and t = 0.5.  In the
second, the first firm’s signal is perfectly informative while the second firm’s signal is totally
uninformative:  p1 = 1 and p2 = 0.5, with 0 < t < 1.
3. Comparison model
Since our point is to show how the existence of a capacity choice stage changes the
incentives to share information, and leads to information sharing in equilibrium, we want to
start from a situation in which a corresponding model without the capacity choice stage would
have no information sharing in equilibrium.  This leads us to define a Comparison Model and to
analyze it for cases in which the parameters match those of our special cases of interest.
Consider a model without capacity choice or capacity constraints obtained from the
General Model by (1) eliminating the first stage (capacity choice), (2) removing the capacity
constraint in the third stage (output choice), and (3) using production cost of c+d per unit in
the third stage (output choice).  In this Comparison Model, “capacity” and output decisions
are made simultaneously in the final strategic stage.  There is never any unused capacity in any11
state of the world, and there is never a capacity constraint.  The production cost is set at c+d
per unit so the cost matches that in the General Model when a firm always uses all of its
capacity.
The solution for this Comparison Model follows easily from the solution for the
General Model.  For the Third Stage of the General Model, use d* = c + d as the per unit cost
of production, c* = 0 as the cost of capacity, and Ki* = H/B as capacity (since it is larger than
any output the firm would ever find optimal).  The resulting Third Stage equilibria with and
without information sharing lead to expected profits pi
S and pi
NS, i = 1,2 respectively.  The
Second Stage equilibrium involves a comparison of these profits just as in the General Model,
and there is no First Stage to solve.  If pi
S > pi
NS for i = 1,2, then there is a unique subgame
perfect equilibrium and it involves information sharing.  If pi
S < pi
NS for i = 1 or i = 2, then
there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium and it does not involve information sharing.  If
pi
S ‡ pi
NS for i = 1,2, with equality for at least one firm, then there are two subgame perfect
equilibria, one with information sharing and the other without information sharing.
For the Comparison Model, when p1 = p2 = p, the Third Stage equilibrium is
symmetric,  with equal expected profits (written as functions of the parameters p and t),   
p1
S(p, t) = p2
S(p, t) = p
S(p, t) and p1
NS(p, t) = p2
NS(p, t) = p
NS(p, t).  The Second Stage
equilibrium involves information sharing if p
S(p, t) > p
NS(p, t),   and involves nonsharing if
p
S(p, t) < p
NS(p, t).  When p
S(p, t) = p
NS(p, t), there are two Second Stage equilibria.     The
(p, t) combinations at which the equilibrium involves information sharing are shown as the
shaded area in Figure 1 (see the Appendix for derivation of this figure).  They are combinations
in which p is “large” and t is either “near 0” or “near 1.”  In the first of our special cases, with
equally well informed firms (0.5 < p1 = p2 = p < 1), we have chosen t = 0.5 since for each p
value it is the t value which both maximizes the profit advantage of the nonsharing payoff over12
the sharing payoff, p
NS(p, t) - p
S(p, t) and is furthest from the region in which information




In the second of our special cases, with p1 = 1 and p2 = 0.5, for the Comparison Model
the uninformed firm would like to share information but the firm that will receive the
completely informative signal prefers not to share.  In equilibrium, sharing does not occur.
(See the Appendix for a derivation of this result.)
4. Results
With capacity constraints, the analysis becomes more complicated than that in the
Comparison Model.  The capacity constraint might never, always, or sometimes be binding in
the Third stage equilibrium.
If each firm’s capacity is sufficiently large, then in the Third Stage, the capacity
constraints will never be binding, and the result of the Third Stage is as in the Comparison
Model.  However, as long as the cost of capacity is strictly positive, this will never occur in a
subgame perfect equilibrium of the overall game.  The savings in cost of capacity for a slight
reduction in capacity is a first-order effect while the reduction in revenue (net of production
cost) due to the sometimes (slightly) binding capacity constraint in the Third Stage is a second-
order effect.
If each firm’s capacity is sufficiently small, then in the Third Stage, the capacity
constraints will always be binding, and the result of the Third Stage is production at capacity
by both firms, independent of the information structure (sharing or nonsharing) and the signals
received.  This case will occur in a subgame perfect equilibrium of the overall game whenever12a
Figure 1: Parameter Values with Sharing Equilibrium in Eqal Information
Comparison Model13
the cost of capacity is sufficiently high.  In such a case, there are always two equilibria of the
overall game, one with information sharing and one without, with identical quantity choices
(always capacity) and expected profit.  The information sharing issue is totally uninteresting
here.
The effect of capacity choice on the information sharing decision is potentially
interesting only when the cost of capacity is strictly positive, but not so large that firms are
always capacity constrained in the Third Stage.  In this case, in the Third Stage equilibrium
firms are sometimes capacity constrained and sometimes not, depending on the information
structure (sharing or nonsharing) and the signals received.  The analysis becomes complicated
because each different combination of the information structure, signals received, and whether
the capacity constraint is binding leads to a different version of the formulas for Second Stage
profits, pi
S(K1, K2) and pi
NS(K1, K2), i = 1,2.  In (K1, K2)-space, we must find the boundaries
dividing the regions in which these different formulas apply.  Given (K1, K2), once the
appropriate formulas for pi
S(K1, K2) and pi
NS(K1, K2), i = 1,2 have been determined, the
Second Stage equilibrium can be determined.  To determine whether (K1*, K2*) is a First
Stage equilibrium, we need to check whether p1(K1*, K2*) ‡ p1(K1, K2*) for all K1, which
typically involves comparison between several different regions (and thus formulas), and
similarly, whether p2(K1*, K2*) ‡ p2(K1, K2*) for all K2.  This process is particularly tedious
for the first example, in which firms are equally well informed.
4A. First Example
Assume the firms are equally well informed, with 0.5 < p1 = p2 < 1 and t = 0.5.  Recall
that in the Comparison Model, for these parameter values the subgame perfect equilibrium
never involved information sharing.   In the following statement of results, we restrict our
attention to values of the cost of capacity, c, at which chosen capacities are not always binding14
in the Third Stage.  (We also impose parameter restrictions to insure that the Third Stage
equilibrium quantities and prices are always strictly positive.  See the Appendix.)
Result 1:  With equal information and t = 0.5, unless the cost of capacity is extremely low,
there always is a subgame perfect equilibrium in which the second stage choice is information
sharing.  (See the Appendix for details of this result.)
When the cost of capacity is extremely low, there is no such equilibrium.  In these
cases, in equilibrium the firms are virtually unconstrained by capacity in the Third Stage, so the
result matches that in the Comparison Model.
4B. Second Example
Assume firm 1 has perfect information (p1 = 1) while firm 2 has no information (p2 =
0.5).  Recall that in the Comparison Model, for these parameter values the subgame perfect
equilibrium never involved information sharing.  In the following statement of results, we
restrict our attention to values of the cost of capacity, c, at which chosen capacities are not
always binding in the Third Stage.
Here the existence of an equilibrium involving information sharing is not so pervasive
as in the first example, but is still robust.  To indicate what we mean by robust, consider the
following special case.  The condition (H-d)/(L-d) = (1+t)/t is added to allow us to graph the
result, and is not essential for the qualitative nature of the result.  (This is the largest (H-d)/(L-
d) ratio at which, independent of the cost of capacity, for any realization of the intercept and
signals, the Third Stage equilibrium quantities always leave A - Bq1 - Bq2 nonnegative.)  The
other added restrictions (B=1 and L=1) are merely normalizations which play no substantive
role.
Result 2:  Let p1=1, p2=0.5, B=1, L=1 and (H-d)/(L-d) = (1+t)/t. For this special case, the
shaded region in Figure 2 indicates the combinations of the parameters, t and c/(1 - d), at15
which there is a subgame perfect equilibrium in which the second stage choice is information




For every t value satisfying 0 < t < 1, there are c/(1 - d) values such that an equilibrium
involves information sharing, with mid-level t values leading to the largest range of
corresponding c/(1 - d) values.  (With the given parameter values, c/(1 - d) ‡ 1 corresponds to
the uninteresting case in which the firms are always capacity constrained.)
4C. Disclosure
In the context of the Second Example, it is easy to examine the impact of a capacity
choice stage on the incentive to disclose information.  By information disclosure we mean that
in the Second Stage, each firm unilaterally decides whether the other firm will receive both
signals.  By deciding to disclose its information, the firm commits to reveal its information
without any quid pro quo from the other firm.  Also, the firm receiving the disclosure cannot
commit not to use the revealed information.  (A forward induction argument might be used to
justify this assumption.  By having disclosed its information, the disclosing firm is indicating
that it will play its part in a Third Stage equilibrium in which the other firm has received both
signals.)  With p2 = 0.5, firm two has no information to disclose, so its disclosure decision is
irrelevant.  Firm one will receive perfect information, so its disclosure decision is relevant.
How do the incentives to share information compare to the incentives to disclose
information?  With p1 = 1 and p2 = 0.5, from firm one’s perspective, sharing and disclosure are
identical:  firm one wants to disclose if and only if it would want to share information.  From
firm two’s perspective, sharing information is the same as having firm one disclose its
information.  In the Comparison Model, firm two always wanted to share information, but that15a
Figure 2: Parameter Values with Sharing Equilibrium for Second Example16
is no longer the case when there is a capacity choice stage.  In the Second Example,
information sharing sometimes does not occur because it is vetoed by firm two.  But firm two
cannot veto disclosure.  To prevent disclosure it must have chosen a capacity in the First Stage
such that firm one does not want to disclose.  Thus the range of parameter values with
information sharing in Result 2 understates the range of parameter values for which disclosure
would occur.
Result 3:  Let p1=1, p2=0.5, B=1, L=1 and (H-d)/(L-d) = (1+t)/t.  For this special case, there is
a subgame perfect equilibrium in which the second stage choice is disclosure for any (t, c/(1 -
d)) with 0 < t < 1 and 0 < c/(1 - d) < 1 that lies above the lower boundary of the shaded region
in Figure 2.  (See the Appendix for details of this result.)
5. Conclusion
By comparing the results from a three-stage game of capacity choices, information-
sharing decisions, and output choices, with those from a corresponding two-stage game of
information-sharing decisions and output choices (without capacity choices or capacity
constraints), we have shown that the existence of a capacity-choice stage may reverse the
incentives to share information.  Though our results are presented in the form of two special
examples, they are much more robust.
The intuition is most easily understood when capacities are exogenously fixed rather
than choice variables:  When set at certain levels, the capacity constraints can reduce one of the
profit-reducing effects of information sharing.  With information sharing, when both firms
receive high signals they are confident that the demand intercept is large.  In their resulting
output choices, the capacity constraints are binding, and prevent the firms from being “too
competitive.”  Without information sharing, when firms receive a high signal they are less sure
that the demand intercept is large.  In their resulting output choices, the capacity constraint17
does not bind as often or with as much impact.  Thus, for certain exogenous capacity levels,
information sharing becomes relatively more attractive to the firms than it would have been
without the capacity constraints.  We have shown that such capacity levels are sometimes, but
not always, endogenously chosen in the equilibria of the three-stage game.18
Appendix
This appendix contains the proofs for the Second Example, Disclosure, the First
Example, and the Comparison Model, in that order.  The level of detail diminishes in later parts
of the appendix, as the method of analysis becomes familiar.
Second Example
Most of the analysis will use p1 = 1, p2 = 0.5, (H-d)/(L-d) £ (1+t)/t but general values
for the other parameters.  Near the end of the proof, the specific values B = 1,         L = 1, and
(H-d)/(L-d) = (1+t)/t will be added.
Third Stage with information sharing:  This section solves for the Third Stage equilibrium
in quantities given K1, K2, and the assumption that information will be shared.  Both firms have
perfect information so the states can be solved separately.  The Third Stage equilibrium
quantities depend on the known, true intercept and whether either firm is capacity constrained.
If I is the known realization of the intercept (I=H or I=L), then the quantity equilibrium given
that realization takes one of three forms:
q1
I = q2
I = (I - d)/3B if Ki ‡ (I - d)/3B for i = 1,2
q1
I = K1, q2
I = K2 if Ki £ (I - d - BKj)/2B for i,j = 1,2, i„j
qi
I = Ki, qj
I = (I - d - BKi)/2B if Ki £ (I - d - BKj)/2B and Kj ‡ (I - d - BKi)/2B
for i,j = 1,2, i„j
Since each firm may be capacity constrained in neither state, in the high state, or in both




The expected profits in each region are as follows.18a
Figure 3: Third Stage Sharing Equilibrium in Second Example19
1. Neither is capacity constrained.
pi
S(K1, K2) = t(H-d)
2/9B + (1-t)(L-d)
2/9B - cKi for i = 1,2
2. Firm 2 is capacity constrained in the high state.
p1




S(K1, K2) = tK2(H-d-BK2)/2 + (1-t)(L-d)
2/9B - cK2
3. Both firms are capacity constrained in the high state.
p1
S(K1, K2) = tK1(H-d-BK1-BK2) + (1-t)(L-d)
2/9B - cK1
p2
S(K1, K2) = tK2(H-d-BK1-BK2) + (1-t)(L-d)
2/9B - cK2
4. Firm 2 is capacity constrained in both states.
p1




S(K1, K2) = K2(tH + (1-t)L-d-BK2)/2 - cK2
5. Firm 2 is capacity constrained in both states while firm 1 is capacity constrained in the
high state.
p1
S(K1, K2) = tK1(H-d-BK1-BK2) + (1-t)(L-d-BK2)
2/4B - cK1
p2
S(K1, K2) = K2(2tH+(1-t)L-d-2tBK1-(1+t)BK2)/2 - cK2
6. Both firms are capacity constrained in both states.
pi
S(K1, K2) = Ki(tH+(1-t)L-d-BK1-BK2) - cKi for i = 1,2.
For regions 2a, 4a, and 5a, just switch the roles of the two firms in regions 2, 4, and 5
respectively.
Third Stage without information sharing:  This section solves for the Third Stage
equilibrium in quantities given K1, K2, and the assumption that information will not be shared.
Firm 1 has perfect information, and chooses q1
H and q1
L while firm 2 gets no information from
its signal, and chooses q2 (technically, firm 2 chooses q2
H and q2
L, but since the signals H and L
provide no information, the optimal choices will always have q2
H = q2
L).  Since firm 2 is either




The Third Stage equilibrium quantities and expected profits in each region are as
follows.











NS(K1, K2) = (tH+(1-t)L-d)
2/9B - cK2











NS(K1, K2) = (2tH+(1-t)L-(1+t)d-2BtK1)
2/B(3+t)
2 - cK2






NS(K1, K2) = K1(tH+(1-t)L-d-BK1)/2
 - cK1
p2
NS(K1, K2) = (tH+(1-t)L-d-BK1)
2/4B - cK2





Figure 4: Third Stage Nonsharing Equilibrium in Second Example21
q2 = K2
p1




NS(K1, K2) = K2(tH+(1-t)L-d-BK2)/2 - cK2







NS(K1, K2) = tK1(H-d-BK1-BK2)+(1-t)(L-d-BK2)
2/4B - cK1
p2
NS(K1, K2) = K2(2tH+(1-t)L-(1+t)d-2tBK1-(1+t)BK2)/2 - cK2






NS(K1, K2) = K1(tH+(1-t)L-d-BK1-BK2) - cK1
p2
NS(K1, K2) = K2(tH+(1-t)L-d-BK1-BK2) - cK2
Note with (H-d)/(L-d) £ (1+t)/t, as we have assumed, the formulas lead to nonnegative
quantities in each region.  For (H-d)/(L-d) > (1+t)/t some of the formulas would need to
change to reflect the nonnegativity constraints.
Equilibrium conditional on sharing:  Since we are interested in overall equilibria in which
information sharing occurs, in this section we will skip the Second Stage and solve the First
Stage assuming the firms decide to share information in the Second Stage.  After finding these
"sharing equilibria," in the next section we will determine parameter values for which these
"equilibria" are true equilibria of the actual three stage game.22
Assume the firms will share information in the Second Stage independent of the
capacity levels.  Now consider the First Stage.  Since the problem is symmetric, we will
determine the optimal K2 given K1 only.  Within each of the nine regions, for each value of K1,
p2
S is concave in K2.  Ignoring the boundaries of the regions, the list below indicates the
solutions to the first-order-conditions for the problem of maximizing the profit formula for p2
S
within each region with respect to K2 (or, if the profit formula is everywhere declining in K2, 0










The actual maximizer within each region is given by the solution above if that capacity
level lies within the region.  If not, the maximizer is the closest boundary point of the region
with the same value of K1.  Comparing the “regional maximizers” yields the best response for
firm 2, K2(K1).
Next combine the best responses, K2(K1) and K1(K2), to find a Nash equilibrium in
capacities conditional on sharing in the Second Stage.  For each value of c, there is a unique
"sharing equilibrium," and it is symmetric.  There are three cases.23
1. For c ‡ tH+(1-t)L-d, K1
* = K2
* = 0, and profit is zero.
2. For tH+(1-t)L-d>c‡t(H-L), K1
* = K2
* = (tH+(1-t)L-d-c)/3B and each firm's profit is
(tH+(1-t)L-d-c)
2/9B.  Both firms are always capacity constrained.
3. For t(H-L)>c>0, K1
* = K2
* = (tH-td-c)/3Bt and each firm's profit is (tH-td-c)
2/9Bt + (1-
t)(L-d)
2/9B.  Both firms are capacity constrained in the high but not the low state.
Checking whether “sharing equilibria” are true equilibria:  For c ‡ t(H-L), the "equilibria"
assuming nonsharing in the Second Stage are identical to those assuming sharing.  The firms
are always capacity constrained, and there is no interesting information-sharing question.  We
now turn to the case t(H-L)>c>0, and introduce the special parameter assumptions B=1, L=1,
and (H-d)/(L-d) = (1+t)/t (so H=1+(1-d)/t).  With these parameter values, the case becomes 1-
d>c>0.  Given the "sharing equilibrium," which for these parameter value is K1
* = K2
* = ((1-
d)(1+t)-c)/3t with each firm's profit ((1-d)(1+t)-c)
2/9t + (1-t)(1-d)
2/9, all that remains is to
show that, in the First Stage, neither firm wants to change capacity to a level at which
nonsharing would be the Second Stage outcome.  In Figure 3, as c varies, these "equilibria"
trace out the diagonal of region 3.  In Figure 4, these points fall in regions 2 and 5.
First consider firm 2.  Given K1 at one of these "equilibria," varying K2 leads to points
in regions 2, 5, and possibly 6 (if c is sufficiently large, so that the K1 value is sufficiently small)
of Figure 4.  At these points, p2
NS(K1, K2) is decreasing in K2 within region 2 and increasing in
K2 within region 6, and the K2 value that maximizes p2
NS given K1 lies in the interior or along
the top boundary of region 5.  These maximizing values for K2 (written as a function of c
rather than K1) take two forms:  if c>(1-t)(7+t)(1-d)/8(2+t), K2 = ((1-d)(7+t)-4c)/6(1+t) with
p2
NS = ((1-d)(7+t)-4c)
2/72(1+t); if c￿(1-t)(7+t)(1-d)/8(2+t), K 2 = ((1-d)(7+t)+2c)/3(3+t) with
p2
NS = ((1-d)(7+t)+2c)((1-d)(7+t)-(7+3t)c)/9(3+t)
2.  Comparing this best nonsharing profit to
the "sharing equilibrium" profit, firm 2 does not want to deviate from the "sharing equilibrium"
if and only if c/(1-d)£1-t/2- t(1+ t) / 8.24
Now consider possible deviations by firm 1.  For (1-t)/(1+t)£c/(1-d)<1, the "sharing
equilibrium" is in nonsharing region 5, and given K2
* and assuming nonsharing in the Second
Stage, the best K1 from regions 4, 5, and 6 is the sharing equilibrium K1







2)/36 which is positive for c/(1-d)<1, which holds here.
We must still check whether firm 1 would prefer to deviate to nonsharing regions 1, 2,
or 3.  When c/(1-d)>(1-t), K2
* is too low for any point in those regions to be feasible for firm
1, so firm 1 will not deviate from the "sharing equilibrium."  Now consider c/(1-d)£(1-t), so
parts of regions 1, 2, and 3 are available.  For c/(1-d)>4t/3(3+t), the best K1 from these regions
is in the interior of 2, with K1
** = (3+t)


















For c/(1-d)£4t/3(3+t), the best K1 from regions 1, 2, and 3 is at the boundary between
regions 1 and 2, at K1









2 + 2(c/(1-d))(5-t)+5(1-t)) which is positive (within this
region) when c/(1-d)>(-5+t+ 45-30t + t
2  )/4.
Combining all the observations, we obtain Figure 2 in the text.  The upper boundary is
given by the condition for firm 2:  c/(1-d)£1-t/2- t(1+ t) / 8.  The lower boundary is given by




2) when c/(1-d)>4t/3(3+t) [this is approximately when
t<0.58] and c/(1-d)‡(-5+t+ 45-30t + t
2  )/4 when c/(1-d)£4t/3(3+t).
Disclosure25
The disclosure result follows from the Second Example with these additional
observations.  Firm 1 wants to disclose if and only if it prefers to share information, i.e., if and
only if (t, c/(1-d)) is above the bottom boundary in Figure 2.  Since disclosure is unilateral, to
overturn the "equilibrium" firm 2 must choose a K2 in the First Stage such that firm 1 does not
want to disclose at (K1
*, K2) [since K2
* is best for firm 2 conditional on K1
* and
sharing/disclosure occurring in the Second Stage] and the profit for firm 2 without disclosure
at (K1
*, K2) is better than its profit with disclosure at (K1
*, K2
*).  Among the K2 that move (K1
*,
K2) to regions 5 or 6 in Figure 3, the one that maximizes p2
NS





*).  At all K2 that move (K1





At all remaining K2, firm 1 wants to disclose.  Thus disclosure occurs in equilibrium at every (t,
c/(1-d)) above the bottom boundary in Figure 2.
First Example
The initial analysis uses p1 = p2 = p but allows a general t.  This allows us to use the
results for the Comparison Model as well.  We will use the following notation:
m = tH+(1-t)L-d, D = H-L, and R = t(1-t)(2p-1).  Let PS be the probability that a firm has
information S.  For the nonsharing case S = H or S = L, and PH = 1-p-t+2tp, PL = p+t-2tp.  For
the sharing case, S = HH, HL, LH, or LL, and PHH = tp
2 + (1-t)(1-p)




Recall the corresponding E
S for firm i is the expected value for the realization of A-Bqj
given information S.  We impose sufficient assumptions so that, in the relevant region, both
firms will always have non-zero outputs in the Third Stage equilibrium in outputs.  (The
conditions are noted at the end of each discussion of the Third Stage.)  Thus, in the relevant
region, the best response for firm i given information S is qi
S = minimum{Ki, (E
S - d)/2B}with
expected payoff, conditional on S, of (E
S - d - c - BKi)Ki if the firm is capacity constrained and26
(E
S - d)
2/4B - cKi if it is not capacity constrained.  The overall expected profit is the weighted
sum of these conditional expected profits, with weights PS for information S.
For the nonsharing case, for firm i „ j,
E




L - d = m - (DR/PL) - B((PLH/PL)qj
H + (PLL/PL)qj
L).
For the sharing case, for firm i „ j,
E
HH - d =  m + (DR/PHH) - Bqj
HH
E
HL - d =  m - Bqj
HL
E
LH - d =  m - Bqj
LH
E
LL - d =  m - (DR/PLL) - Bqj
LL
Third Stage with information sharing:  We now impose the condition t = 0.5.  Figure 5
indicates the regions in which the capacity constraint is binding in the Third Stage equilibrium
with information sharing.  For firm 1:  in regions 0, 1, 2, and 3 capacity is not binding; in
regions 1a, 4, 5, and 6 capacity is binding for S = HH; in regions 2a, 5a, 7, and 8 capacity is
binding for S = HL, S = LH, and S = HH; in regions 3a, 6a, 8a, and 9 capacity is always




The Third Stage equilibrium quantities with sharing are as follows.  In each region, for
each S, there are three cases.  If both firms are capacity constrained given S, then qi
S = Ki  i =




S* - d)/2B where E
S* is E
S evaluated at q2
S = K2.  If neither firm is capacity
constrained given S, then q1
S = q2
S = X/3B where x = m, if S = HL or S = LH, x = m +26a
Figure 5: Third Stage Sharing Equilibrium in First Example27
(DR/PHH) if S = HH, and x =  m - (DR/PLL) if S = LL.  (We assume the parameters are such
that Bq1
HH + Bq2
HH < L, so all formulas are correct.)
Third Stage without information sharing:  Again with t = 0.5, Figure 6 indicates the regions
in which the capacity constraint is binding in the Third Stage equilibrium without information
sharing.  For firm 1:  in regions 0, 1, and 2 capacity is not binding; in regions 1a, 3, and 4
capacity is binding for S = H; in regions 2a, 4a, and 5 capacity is always binding.  The situation




In regions 2, 2a, 4, 4a, and 5 the Third Stage equilibrium quantities with nonsharing
can be found as in the sharing case since at least one firm is always capacity constrained.  In
the other regions, qi
H „ qi
L for i = 1,2 so both outputs enter into the determination of all non-
capacity-constrained outputs of the other firm.  The non-capacity quantities in the remaining
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Figure 6: Third Stage Nonsharing Equilibrium in First Example28
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(We assume the parameters are such that Bq1
H + Bq2
H < L, so all formulas are correct.)
Equilibrium conditional on sharing:  Continuing with t = 0.5, as in the details of the Second
Example, we now solve the First Stage assuming the firms decide to share information in the
Second Stage.  For every c there is a symmetric "sharing equilibrium", which takes one of four
forms.
1. For c ‡ m, K1
* = K2
* = 0.
2. For m > c ‡ DR/PLL, K1
* = K2
* = (m-c)/3B
and both firms are always capacity constrained.  This is in region 9 of Figure 5.
3. For DR/PLL > c ‡ D(2p-1)/4, K1
* = K2
* = (m/3B) - (2c/3B(1+2p-2p
2)) +
(D(2p-1)/6B(1+2p-2p
2)) and both firms are capacity constrained except when S = LL.  This is
in region 7 of Figure 5.
4. For D(2p-1)/4 > c ‡ 0, K1
* = K2
* = (m/3B) - (2c/3B(1-2p+2p
2)) +
(D(2p-1)/6B(1-2p+2p
2)) and both firms are capacity constrained only when S = HH.  This is in
region 4 of Figure 5.  (At c = 0, the capacity constraint stops being binding even when S =
HH.)
Checking whether "sharing equilibria" are true equilibria:  Comparing Figures 5 and 6,
the upper-right corner of regions 3 (5) in the nonsharing case lies in the interior of region 4 (7)
of the sharing case.  For c ‡ DR/PLL the firms are always capacity constrained and there is no
difference between the sharing and nonsharing cases.  Consider c < DR/PLL with corresponding
"sharing equilibrium" (K1
*, K2
*).  Since the problem is symmetric, we need only check whether29
firm 1 would prefer to deviate.  Since the initial (K1
*, K2
*) is a "sharing equilibrium," we need





*) for all K1 ‡ 0.  For Dp(2p-1)(1-p)/2(3-
4p+4p
2) < c < DR/PLL, if firm 1 deviates to nonsharing, the other firm's capacity constraint is
binding for at least one S, and no deviation improves the payoff of firm 1.
For c < Dp(2p-1)(1-p)/2(3-4p+4p
2), at (K1
*, K2
*) both firms always have excess
capacity for the Third Stage in the nonsharing case.  By deviating to K1 with no excess
capacity, firm 1 obtains expected profit p
NS(p, 0.5) - cK1 (where p
NS is the nonsharing profit in
the Comparison Model).  As c converges to 0, the profit in the "sharing equilibrium" converges
to p
S(p, 0.5) (again from the Comparison Model), which is less than p
NS(p, 0.5) by the result
for the Comparison Model.  Thus the "sharing equilibrium" cannot be a true equilibrium if c is
sufficiently near 0.  In fact there is a strictly positive c* in this range such that the "sharing
equilibrium" is a true equilibrium if and only if c ‡ c*.
Comparison Model
Let p1 = p2 = p.  For both sharing and nonsharing, the quantity-setting equilibrium
matches that in region 0 of the Third Stage in the First Example, and the equilibrium expected
profits correspond to c = 0 in region 0 of the First Example.  Then p
S(p, t) - p
NS(p, t) has the
same sign as (-3/8) + (7p/4) - (15p
2/4) + 4p
3 - 2p
4 + (6 - 27p + 39p
2 - 24p
3 + 12p





2 where z = (t - 0.5)
2.  For 0.5 < p < 1 and 0 < t < 1, this is
positive if and only if (p, t) lies in the shaded region of Figure 1, which is symmetric about t =
0.5.
Let p1 = 1, p2 = 0.5.  For both sharing and nonsharing the quantity-setting equilibrium
matches that in region 1 of the Third Stage in the Second Example, and the equilibrium
expected profits correspond to c = 0 in region 1 of the Second Example.  Equilibrium expected
profit is convex in output and the equilibrium mean output is the same for each firm whether30
sharing or not.  Thus the preferred case is that in which the firm's output differs most between
S = H and S = L.  Since q2
H = q2
L in the nonsharing case, firm 2 always prefers sharing.  Since
firm 2 has constant output in the nonsharing case, firm 1 is more responsive to the signal when
nonsharing, and thus firm 1 always prefers nonsharing.31
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